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WAIVE THE BULK SALES ACT?
John R. Williamson*
It is not at all uncommon for a lawyer to find himself in the 
position of having to decide whether or not to advise his client to 
waive the requirement that the provision of the Bulk Sales A c t1 be 
complied with. This article will attempt to aid a New Brunswick2 
lawyer in reaching this decision by exploring the possible consequen­
ces of noncompliance. In so setting the scope of the article, it shall be 
assumed that the Bulk Sales Act applies to the transaction and that 
the only question is not how to comply, but whether or not to 
comply. However, the practical problems of compliance can’t be 
ignored by a lawyer as a major factor in deciding what advice to give 
his client. The impracticality of compliance with the Act is what 
makes the question of waiver of such importance. One readily sees 
the practical problems of trying to comply, but doesn’t fully appreci­
ate the risks of noncompliance. Once the risks are understood, a 
lawyer may require compliance more frequently, or take other steps 
such as guarantees, warranties, or trust arrangements in an attempt 
to reduce the risks for his client. Although this article focuses on the 
liabilition of a purchaser who does not comply with the Act, it also 
explores the rights of a creditor of the vendor of stock in bulk, and so 
should be of interest to a lawyer acting for such a creditor. The rights 
of such creditors are greater than most lawyers suspect, and the Bulk 
Sales Act can be a very important weapon in the arsenal of a creditor 
seeking satisfaction of his claim.
Before examining the details of the consequences of noncompli­
ance, it is necessary to understand the purpose and the general 
approach of the Act. The Act was passed by the various provinces to 
fill the gap left by the absence of any bankruptcy legislation at the 
Federal level.3 Mr. Justice Orde stated the purpose of the legisla­
tion as follows:
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of New Brunswick.
1 R.S.N.B. 1973, c. B-9as amended by S.N.B. 1975, c. 10. References to the Bulk Sales
Act or the Act and to section numbers will refer to this Act, unless otherwise 
indicated.
2 This article will deal specifically with the provisions of the New Brunswick Bulk 
Sales Act. However, the article should have considerable relevance in other 
provinces since the legislation is generally quite similar and in some cases virtually 
identical.
3 LaForest, G. V., “ Filing Under the Conditional Sales Act: Is it Notice to Subsequent 
Purchasers," (1958) 36 Can. B.R. 387, at p. 395.
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Prior to the Bulk Sales Act, there was nothing in itself illegal in bulk sale, 
and the vendor was entitled to deal with the proceeds of the sale as his own.
But to protect creditors against the effect of a secret though valid sale of 
the debtor’s stock and the possible unfair distribution or dissipation of the 
proceeds, the Bulk Sales Act was passed making it incumbent upon a 
purchaser under such circumstances to take certain steps to protect the 
creditors, if any, at the risk of finding his purchase votó if he failed to 
comply. 4
The fact that the duty is clearly placed on the purchaser of stock in 
bulk must be emphasized. Unless the purchaser gets a sufficient 
statement and declaration of the creditors from the vendor as 
required by s. 4 of the Act; and unless the purchaser then assures 
himself that those creditors are paid in full, or that the requisite pro­
portion consents to the sale, or waives the application of the provi­
sions of the Act as provided in s. 5; then the purchaser makes him­
self liable to the creditors of the vendor as provided in s. 9 of the Act. 
The consequences as provided in s. 9 appear to go beyond mere pro­
tection of the claims of the creditors. Indeed, they seem to impose 
penalties for non-compliance as a further coercion persuading a 
purchaser to comply with the Act. We shall now examine the scope 
of these consequences, and the limitation period within which a 
creditor must take action.
The first result of noncompliance is found in s. 9(1) of the Act 
which provides as follows:
9(1) A sale in bulk in respect of which this Act has not been complied with 
shall be deemed to be fraudulent and void as against the creditors of the 
vendor, and every payment made on account of the purchase price, and 
every delivery of a note or other security therefor, and every transfer, con­
veyance and encumbrance of property by the purchaser shall be deemed to 
be fraudulent and void, as between the purchaser and the creditors of the 
vendor.
It should be noted that this subsection has two aspects: the first 
relates to the sale, the second relates to the payment of the purchase 
price. We shall deal with these aspects in order.
The provision which declares the sale to be both fraudulent and 
void was dealt with extensively by the Supreme Court of Canada in 
the case of Re Crouse: Garson v. Canadian Credit Men's Trust 
Association. 5 The provision in the Nova Scotia legislationh under 
consideration in that case was virtually identical to that portion of s. 
9(1) of the New Brunswick Act relating to the sale. In this case, a sale 
was caught by the Nova Scotia legislation, but there was no compli­
4 Re St. Thomas Cabinets Ltd. (1921), 61 D.L.R. 487 (Ont. S.C. at p. 491.
5 [1929] S.C.R. 282.
6 Bulk Sales Act. R.S.N.S. (1923), c. 202.
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ance with their statute. In th* course of the decision7 the purpose 
and effect of the provision declaring the sale to be “void” as against 
the creditors of the vendor was discussed. In the vi»‘w of the Court, the 
purpose was to allow the creditors to take their writs of execution 
issued against the vendor, and seize and sell the stock sold in contra­
vention of the legislation8 by the vendor to the purchaser. Without 
such a provision, title to the stock would have vested in the 
purchaser, and the creditors of the vendor would have no means of 
reaching it to satisfy their claims. This decision makes it clear that 
the effect of the first aspect of s. 9(1) of the Act deals with the title to 
the stock subject to the bulk sale. The provision accords with the 
purpose of the Act in protecting creditors; ensuring that their 
position is not prejudiced by the sale.
Before examining the Crouse case further, the creditors’ ability 
to seize the purchaser’s stock shall be pursued. The New Brunswick 
legislation goes beyond mere protection of the creditors, and 
imposes what can only be termed a penalty for noncompliance. Sub­
section 9(3) provides:
9(3) In an action brought, or proceedings had or taken by a creditor of the 
vendor within the time limited by section 11 to set aside or have declared 
void in a sale in bulk, or in the event of a seizure of the stock in the posses­
sion of the purchaser, or some part thereof, under judicial process issued 
by or on behalf of a creditor of the vendor within such period, the 
purchaser is estopped from denying that the stock in his possession at the 
time of the action, proceedings or seizure is the stock purchased or received 
by him from the vendor.
The declaration in s. 9(1) that the sale is void is effectively extended 
to all the stock in the possession of the purchaser at the relevant time 
regardless of whether or not this stock was purchased from the 
vendor. This becomes even more significant when one looks at the 
very broad statutory definition of stock found in s. 1(f) of the Act. 
The term “ stock” has a definition more or less equivalent to the 
ordinary meaning of the word stock, that is, the stock of goods or 
inventory of a business.9 However, many jurisdictions, including 
New Brunswick, have extended statutory definitions which include
7 Re Crouse: Garsonv. Canadian Credit Men's Trust Association, [1929] S.C.R. 282, 
at p. 286.
8 There is some conflicting authority as to whether creditors of the vendor can seize
stock under writs of execution issued against the vendor without having first taken 
proceedings to have the sale set aside. For the position that no proceedings to have 
the sale set aside is necessary see W ebber\. Hall. (1921), 52 D.L.R. 253 (N.S.C.A.); 
and Shediac Boat and Shoe Co. v. Buchanan, (1903), 35 N.S.R. 511 (C.A.); for the 
contrary view see McHugh v. Campbell (1922), 22 O.W.N. 464 (C.A.). I would 
suggest that the Nova Scotia cases would be followed in New Brunswick particularly 
in light of the fact that s. 9(3) clearly seems to contemplate such a procedure.
9 Norris v. McKenzie. [1933] 3 D.L.R. 713 (N.S.S.C.).
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chattels with which a person carries on a business, trade, or occupa­
tion. Not only is the inventory of a business caught but also the tools, 
equipment, furniture, delivery trucks, finished products and, argu­
ably, raw m aterials10 of the business, are caught. The scope of this 
penalty in s. 9(3) is further broadened when one realizes that there is 
neither a limitation that the stock in the purchaser’s possession be of 
the same kind or nature as that purchased from the vendor, nor that 
it be part of the same or a similar business as that purchased from 
the vendor.
This provision could easily prove a windfall for the creditors of 
the vendor, and a complete and utter disaster for the purchaser. As 
an illustration of what could happen, suppose that Vendor (V) has 
creditors with claims of $1,000,000.00 and assets consisting of inven­
tory worth $100,000.00. Purchaser (P) has assets excluding real 
estate worth $5,000,000.00 consisting of inventory, raw materials, 
tools, equipment, delivery trucks, etc. P purchases V’s inventory for 
$100,000.00 but fails to comply with the Bulk Sales Act. Before P 
knows what’s happening, V’s creditors may have seized equipment, 
trucks and inventory worth not just $100,000.00 but worth 
$1,000,000.00. The purchaser cannot deny that he received this 
stock from the vendor under the bulk sale by virtue of s. 9(3), even 
though in fact he may have purchased it years before the sale. S. 9(1) 
then takes effect, and declares that the sale is void and that the title 
to that stock is still in the vendor. Therefore it is still available to 
satisfy the full claims of the vendor’s creditors. There is no other 
limit on the amount of the purchaser’s stock that can be seized 
under s. 9(3). Such a result is penal, and should make any purchaser 
think twice before agreeing to waive compliance under the Bulk 
Sales Act.
The risk of such a consequence is apparently reduced, by s. 11 
of the Act which provides:
11. No action shall be brought or proceeding had or taken to set aside or
have declared void a sale in bulk for failure to comply with this Act, unless
the action is brought or proceedings had or taken within six months from
the date of the completion of the sale.
In evaluating the risk of noncompliance as far as an attack on the 
sale is concerned, it may be possible to see six months in the future 
with some degree of certainty. Purchaser may be willing to take such 
a risk for a period of 6 months. However, before getting too comfort­
able with the six-month limitation period, let us return to the Crouse 
case to examine what the Supreme Court of Canada said about the 
scope of s. 9(1).
10 Kerr, Robert W., Legal Remedies o f  the Unsecured Creditor Afterjudgm ent. Third 
Report of the New Brunswick Consumer Protection Project, Vol. II (1976), p. 168.
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In the Crouse case, the creditors did not attack the sale or seize 
the stock until after the purchaser had sold it to a bona fide purchas­
er for value. There was no question in the Court’s mind that the 
bona fide purchaser would be protected, since “void” would be 
interpreted as “voidable” for that purpose. As there was no question 
of seizing the stock, the issue centred on the rights of the creditors to 
the proceeds of the sale of the stock. The declaration in the statute 
that the sale was void did not alleviate the personal liability of the 
purchaser to account for the proceeds from the sale of the stock. 
There was no provision equivalent to our s. 9(2) (which we shall 
examine in detail shortly). These problems did not deter the 
Supreme Court, which focused on the declaration in s. 9(1) that the 
sale was deemed not only void, but also fraudulent. Mr. Justice 
Lamont speaking for the court proceeded as follows:
In our opinion the removal of the impediment which intercepted the action 
of the creditors' writs of execution was not the only effect which it was 
intended the legislation should have. Had that been the only effect intend­
ed, there was no necessity whatever for enacting that the sale should be 
deemed fraudulent. The setting aside of the sale as invalid would, without 
branding it as fraudulent, have been sufficient to remove the impediment 
to the operation of the writs of execution. The creation of a statutory 
presumption of fraud on the part of both purchaser and vendor as against 
the vendor’s creditors, indicates, in our opinion, a legislative intention to 
put a sale in bulk made without compliance with the Bulk Sales Act in the 
same category as sales made with an intention to defraud the vendor’s 
creditors. Such intent the Act presumes to exist, and this presumption of 
fraud has the effect of bringing into play all other statutes passed for the 
protection of creditors against a fraudulent sale of his goods by a debtor to 
the prejudice of his creditors. So that, if, in any such statute the legislature 
has given to the creditors any remedy in addition to their right to have the 
sale set aside as invalid, the creditors of a fraudulent debtor under the Bulk 
Sales Act are entitled to claim the benefit of such remedy, provided, of 
course, that all the conditions precedent to the right to claim the remedy 
have been fulfilled. H
The Supreme Court then held that the creditors were entitled to the 
proceeds by virtue of the provision of the Nova Scotia Assignments 
A ct.12 Due to s. 9(2) of the Act, the decision doesn’t have great 
significance in New Brunswick today insofar as a duty to account is 
concerned. However, the principle that the deemed fraudulent intent 
can be used for the purpose of other legislation has been of consider­
able significance to the application of the six-month limitation 
period contained in s .l l .
One of the first attempts to use this principle of the Crouse case 
was in Re Stewart: Parsons v. Trustee, 13 a decision of Mr. Justice
11 Re Crouse. |1929) S.L.R. 282, at pp. 286-287.
12 R.S.N.S. 1923 c. 200.
13 (1935), 16 C.B.R. 244.
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McEvoy in the Ontario Supreme Court in Bankruptcy. A partner­
ship allegedly sold assets to a company owned by the partners. The 
partnership ultimately went bankrupt and the issue arose as to who 
had title to the assets allegedly sold to the company. No attack had 
been made on the sale within the statutory period. However, in the 
course of the argument, the trustee in bankruptcy for the partner­
ship appears to have argued that since there was no compliance with 
the Ontario Bulk Sales Act, the sale was deemed fraudulent. There­
fore, on the basis of the Crouse case, the sale would be liable to be set 
aside — leaving title to the assets in the partnership. The court, 
however, dismissed this argument by distinguishing the Crouse 
case.14 Mr. Justice McEvoy noted that the Nova Scotia legislation 
under consideration in the Crouse case did not have a limitation 
period as found in the Ontario legislation (which was virtually 
identical to s. 11 of the present New Brunswick Act). The learned 
justice then seems to have concluded that the limitation period also 
limited the deemed fraudulent intent provision, and thus limited or 
restricted the implications of the Crouse case. Mr. Justice McEvoy 
then quoted the following statement from Mr. Justice Middleton’s 
judgment in the case of Allen v. Patterson: IS
It seems to me that the non-compliance with the requirements of the Act 
has the effect of rendering the transaction liable to be declared void as 
against the creditors if attacked within the statutory period. This is the only 
penalty for the violation of the requirements of the Act; and, no attack 
having been made upon the sale in question within the time limited, the 
transaction stands as though the Act had not been passed.16
One could attempt to weaken the weight of this Ontario author­
ity by noting the context in which Mr. Justice Middleton’s statement 
was made. He was dealing with a case in which the rights between 
the purchaser and the vendor were in issue and not the rights of the 
creditors of the vendor against the purchaser. It is in that light that 
this statement should be read. Also, one could point out that Mr. 
Justice McEvoy’s statements themselves were obiter in light of his 
later finding that on the basis of a previous Ontario Court of Appeal 
decision,17 the trustee in bankruptcy for the partnership couldn’t 
attack the transaction for non-compliance with the Bulk Sales Act 
anyway. In any event, it does seem that the results in these Ontario 
cases are correct. It would seem that at least in so far as one attempts 
to use the Crouse case to have a sale declared void, it would have to be
14 Ibid., at p. 248.
15. (1925), 56 O.L.R. 287.
16 Ibid., at p. 289.
17 In Re Parker: Ex parte Golding, (1927), 8 C.B.R. 230.
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commenced within six months from the sale. The terms of s. 11 would 
seem to catch both direct and indirect attacks on the sale, and title to 
the stock subject to the sale, based on non-compliance with the Act.
Yet, one cannot safely leave the Crouse principle thinking that 
title to the stock is safe after six months. Two recent western 
decisions have indicated a willingness to use the Crouse case as the 
basis for setting aside a sale beyond the statutory limitation period. 
In the case of Thompson v. Richardson18, the Alberta Court of 
Appeal considered statutory provisions19 virtually identical to those 
in New Brunswick. It was willing to consider the applicability of 
fraudulent conveyances legislation in light of the deemed fraudulent 
intent, despite the fact that the action had been commenced beyond 
the statutory six-month limitation period. The court, however, found 
on the facts of the case that, even using the deemed fraud provision, 
the fraudulent conveyances legislation was not applicable. The 
interesting aspect here is the willingness of a provincial court of 
appeal to set aside a sale beyond the six-month statutory limitation 
period despite the two Ontario cases, In Re Stewart20 and Allen v. 
Patterson,21 both of which were cited by the Court on a different 
point.
The second western decision is that of Mr. Justice Matas of the 
Manitoba Queen’s Bench in the case of Wiebe v. Holmes.22 This 
case also dealt with statutory provisions23 virtually identical to those 
in New Brunswick. In this case, the Crouse case was specifically 
applied so as to extend the liability of the purchaser beyond the 
statutory six-month limitation period by combining the deemed 
fraud for non-compliance with the Bulk Sales Act and the Manitoba 
Fraudulent Conveyances A ct.24 In light of these western cases, it is 
not safe to assume that you are taking the risk of an attack on the 
sale for six months only. It is not inconveivable that a New Bruns­
wick Court would distinguish the Ontario cases and follow these 
western cases. A purchaser could have at least the stock actually 
purchased from the vendor seized after the six-month limitation 
period. The operation of s. 9(3), on the other hand, is specifically 
limited by s. 11.
18 (1%7), 58 W.W.R. 743.
19 Bulk Sales Act, R.S.A. 1955, c. 33 as amended.
20 (1935), 16 C.B.R. 244.
21 (1925), 57 O.L.R. 287.
22 |19711 4 W.W.R. 588 (Man. Q.B.).
23 Bulk Sales Act. R.S.M. 1954, c. 30.
24 R.S.M. 1954 c. 91 as amended.
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A further consequence which can best be discussed in the 
context of an attack on the sale is found in s. 9(2) of the Act:
9(2) If. however, the purchaser has received or taken possession of the 
stock in bulk, or any part thereof, he is personally liable to account to the 
creditors of the vendor for the value thereof including all money, security or 
property realized or taken by him from, out of, or on account of the sale or 
other disposition by him of the stock in bulk, or any part thereof.
This provision imposes on the purchaser a personal liability to 
account to the creditors of the vendor for the value of the stock 
received, and thus imposes a minimum liability on the purchaser. 
This liability is basically the same as that ultimately imposed on the 
purchaser in the Crouse case in the somewhat circuitous manner 
discussed previously. It should be noted at this stage that the liability 
imposed by s. 9(2) is limited to the value of the stock received. This 
should be contrasted to s. 9(3) where, as pointed out earlier, the only 
limit to the amount of the stock in the purchaser’s possession which 
can be seized is the total amount of the creditor’s claims. S. 9(2) 
seems to be the more reasonable and less penal in nature, and thus 
furthers the basic purpose of protecting creditors of the vendor from 
any worsening of their position as a result of the sale. The important 
aspect with the liability in s. 9(2) is not its existence, but its duration 
— is it limited to the six-month period after the sale by virtue of s. 11 
of the Act? A certain limited liability to account based on the Crouse 
case may extend beyond the six-month period if the western cases25 
are followed. There are two approaches to reaching an answer to this 
question as far as the statutory liability is concerned.
First, it is arguable that the Act has created two alternate 
methods of attack for a creditor under s. 9. The first method is by 
removal of impediments to creditors seeking execution of their judge­
ments against the vendor by attacking title to the stock. The second is 
by suing the purchaser personally for the value of the stock received 
but not the property of the purchaser. From 192726 to 1952 the New 
Brunswick legislation contained the first alternative only. Also, the 
wording of s. 10(2) of the 1927 statute was identical to the wording of 
s. 9(3) of the present legislation including the specific reference to 
the statutory limitation period within which the sale could be set 
aside, or stock seized. When the personal liability to account was 
added by s. 9(2) in 1952, there was no reference made to the limita­
tion period, nor was any change made in s. 9(3) providing for the 
seizure of the stock. If it were intended, in 1952, to have the limita­
tion period apply to both the setting aside of the sale, and the 
personal liability to account, why wasn’t the section made
25 Thompson v. Richardson, (1967), 58 W.W.R. 743 (Alta. C.A.); Wiebe v. Holmes, 
[1971] 4 W.W.R. 588 (Man. Q.B.).
26 R.S.N.B. 1927, c. 150.
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consistent? This could have been done by either adding a reference 
in s. 9(2) to the limitation period, or by deleting the reference to the 
limitation period in s. 9(3). Since this was not done, the indication 
would seem to be that s. 11 was not intended to apply to s. 9(2). A 
close examination of the wording of s. 11 would tend to confirm this 
conclusion. Reference there is made only to an action to have the 
sale set aside or declared void: no mention is made of an accounting.
It may seem strange that the statute would have two greatly dif­
fering limitation periods for basically the same liability. However, it 
should be pointed out again that the liability for seizure can be vastly 
greater because of s. 9(3) than the liability to account under s. 9(2). It 
is not unreasonable to impose a very short period on such a severe 
penalty as found in s. 9(3), but to have a longer period for the 
compensatory liability found in s. 9(2). It should be further noted 
that any liability (imposed by s. 9(2)) beyond the six-month period 
would only be to creditors at the time of the sale2 7 As an illustration 
that legislatures have felt that six years is not too long for such 
liability as found in s. 9(2), one should examine the Nova Scotia 
legislation.28 Under this legislation there is no penalty equivalent to 
New Brunswick’s s. 9(3). The legislation simply declares the sale to 
be void for noncompliance and thus effectively imposes a liability on 
the purchaser to return the stock or account for it under the Crouse 
case - a liability analogous to s. 9(2) of the New Brunswick Act in 
terms of the degree of severity. There is no special limitation period 
found in the Nova Scotia legislation, so that the liability of the 
purchaser extends for six years.
However, there is one basic premise for the conclusion that s. 
9(2) liability extends for six years. The premise is that liability under 
s. 9(2) does not depend on the sale being set aside. In short, s. 9(2) 
must be a clear alternative to, and independent from, the sale being 
set aside and declared void. However, a second approach is found in 
the two western cases discussed earlier in relation to the Crouse 
principle. In Thompson v. Richardson29, the Alberta Court of 
Appeal was considering a statutory provision30 virtually identical to 
s. 9 of the New Brunswick Act. In answer to the argument that the 
liability created by the equivalent of our s. 9(2) was not limited to a 
six-month period, Mr. Justice Allen for the court said:
I cannot agree with this contention. In my view sec. 10 must be read as a
whole and it is necessary that the plaintiff must be able to establish by
27 Bank o fM ontrea l\. Ideal Knitting Mills Ltd., [1924|4 D.L.R. 429 (Ont. C.A.); Re 
St. Thomas Cabinets Ltd.. (1921). 61 D.L.R. 487 (Ont. S.C.).
28 R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 28.
29 ( 1967), 58 W.W.R. 743.
30 R.S.A. 1955 c. 3 s. 10.
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action that the sale is fraudulent and void as against creditors and thus 
must be set aside if he wishes to take advantage of any of the provisions of 
this section. To put it in other words, I think that subsec. (2) of sec. 10 
provides only an ancillary or supplemental remedy to the creditor when a 
sale is set aside after the purchaser has received or taken possession of the 
stock that is the subject of the sale and does not provide an alternative 
remedy to setting aside the sale in cases where the Act is not complied with.
. . .To hold otherwise would create a situation which I am sure was not 
intended by the legislature, namely, that while action to set aside the sale is 
barred after the expiration of six months from the date of sale, action for 
an accounting under subsec. (2) would not be barred for six years from the 
same date. The statute created rights and remedies in favour of a creditor 
which did not exist at common law. It should not be construed to enlarge 
upon those rights and remedies expressly granted by the statute. 31
This decision was followed in the Wiebe v. H olm es32 case decided in 
the Manitoba Queen’s Bench. However, if the legislation did intend 
the liability of s. 9(2) to be supplementary only, that intention could 
have been made much clearer. The opening phrase in our s. 9(2), “ If, 
however” , arguably contemplates the creation of an additional 
liability, one which would be independent from an attack on the title 
to the property. As discussed earlier, it is not unreasonable to 
conclude that the legislature did contemplate that there would be 
two limitation periods depending on the severity of the liability. In 
any event, though the Alberta Court of Appeal decision makes it 
difficult, it is not impossible that a New Brunswick court would 
follow the first approach and hold that the liability to account 
created by s. 9(2) has a limitation period of six years and not just six 
months. This possibility is another factor to consider in deciding on 
whether a purchaser should waive compliance with the Act.
Another, and more or less seperate, result of noncompliance with 
the Act is the possibility of garnishment. Certainly, if the creditors 
did not have the sale set aside under the Act, they would be entitled 
to have the balance of the purchase price owing attached in garnish­
ment proceedings. Such an option seems to be contemplated in the 
following excerpt of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Crouse 
case:
It is now common ground between the parties that in the Bulk Sales Act 
the word “ void” means "voidable” only and that a sale made without com­
pliance with the Act is valid unless and until the creditors of the vendor 
elect to have it set aside. The fact that the Act avoids the sale only as 
against the vendor’s creditors indicated an intention on the part of the 
legislature that on the sale the property in the goods shall pass, subject to 
the right of the creditors to have the sale set aside as fraudulent against 
them. 33
31 (1967). 58 W.W.R. 745 at pp. 752-753.
32 [1971)4 W.W.R. 588.
33 Re Crouse: Garson v. Canadian Credit Mens Trust Association. [1925] S.C.R. 282 
at p. 285.
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The possibility of garnishment of the balance of the purchase price, 
even more than six months after the sale, is not a major risk for a 
purchaser since he would have to pay the vendor anyway. However, 
there is a very good argument that a creditor could both garnish the 
balance of the purchase price and seize the stock. This should be 
possible since an attack on the sale would relate to the title of the 
stock only, and not to the contract as a whole, or to the debt created. 
If a court makes that distinction, then a creditor should not have to 
elect his course of action through the operation of estoppel. The 
right of a creditor to do both would seem to be clearly contemplated 
by the wording of s. 9(1) of the Act. As we shall see in detail shortly, 
this provision makes both the sale and any payment void. Although 
there may be some concern about a creditor being allowed to take 
both approaches,34 legislation in other provinces expressly provides 
for such a result.35 Thus, the possibility of garnishment of the un­
paid balance of the purchase price, plus loss of what was purchased, 
is a risk that the purchaser should not overlook.
The second major consequence of noncompliance as provided 
by s. 9(1) of the Act goes beyond mere garnishment of the unpaid 
balance of the purchase price. It provides as follows:
. . . and every payment made on account of the purchase price, and every 
delivery of a note or other security therefor, and every transfer, conveyance 
and encumbrance of property by the purchaser shall be deemed to be 
fraudulent and void, as between the purchaser and the creditors of the 
vendor.
The effect of this provision appears clear: the purchaser shall be 
deemed to have made no payment on account of the purchase price, 
even though he may have in fact paid in full. Thus, a creditor of the 
vendor in garnishment proceedings could attach the full purchase 
price in every case of noncompliance. The risk of having to pay twice 
is one a purchaser must surely think twice about — particularly 
when one adds the possibility that the creditors may at the same time 
seize the stock in the purchaser’s possession under s. 9(3). This 
second aspect in s. 9(1) relating to garnishment and potential double 
liability is consistent with the penalty approach of s. 9(3) noted 
earlier. To see that such a result was contemplated in the New 
Brunswick legislation (and considered desirable from a policy stand­
point by at least some jurisdictions), we can look at the provision 
found in Saskatchewan and Prince Edward Island. Following a 
provision identical to s. 9(1) of the New Brunswick Act, the legisla­
tion in those two provinces provides as follows:
“(2) Notwithstanding that such sale, barter or exchange is void as against 
the creditors of the vendor, so as to render the goods, wares, merchandise
34 Kerr, op. cit., at p. 187.
35 R.S.S. 1965, c. 389, s. 31(2); R.S.P.E.l. 1974, c. B6. s. 9(2).
1
and fixtures liable to satisfy their claims, the purchaser shall nevertheless 
continue to be indebted to the vendor in the full amount of the purchase 
price in the case of a sale, and in the full value of the goods, wares, 
merchandise and fixtures in the case of barter or exchange, so that the 
indebtedness may be attached by the creditors of the vendor; and the 
purchaser shall also be a trustee of the goods, wares, merchandise fixtures 
for the benefit of the creditors of the vendor, and shall be personally liable 
to account to them for all and any monies or security realized or taken by 
him from, out of, or on account of the sale or other disposition by him of 
the goods, wares, merchandise and fixtures, or any part thereof.” 36
The application of this provision was dealt with in the case of 
Dominion Fruit Lim ited  v. Cove et al. (No. 2) .37
The final problem with regard to the garnishment of the 
purchase price is the limitation period. Certainly, where there is a 
garnishment of the balance of the purchase price in fact owing, the 
six-month limitation period found in s. 11 doesn’t apply. But so far 
as the deemed fraud and voidability of any payment by virtue of s. 
9(1) is concerned, would a garnishment proceeding fall within the 
scope of the language of s. 11? The key here appears to be whether 
garnishment was dependent on, or ancilliary to, the sale being set 
aside. The answer would seem to be no. The garnishment would be 
based on the validity of the sale not on an attack to have it set aside 
or declared void. Section 9(1) itself uses the word and which would 
clearly indicate that the sale and garnishment aspects are separate 
and that garnishment of the full purchase price is in addition to an 
attack on the sale. Further, unlike the cases dealing with the limita­
tion period for the duty to account found under s. 9(2), there is some 
authority for the proposition that the right to garnish the full 
purchase price is separate and independent from an action to have 
the sale set aside. In the Saskatchewan case of Dominion Fruits 
Limited  v. Cove et al. (No. 2) Mr. Justice Davis stated:
Although sec. 31(1) declares that a sale, such as the one in question, shall 
be deemed fraudulent and void as against creditors of the vendor, it is in no 
way related to the declaration contained in subsec. (2) that the purchaser 
shall continue to be indebted to the vendor and that such indebtedness may 
be attached by the creditors of the vendor. The two provisions are not, in 
my opinion, interdependent.38
There is one final note of caution with regard to garnishment. 
In reading the authorities from other jurisdictions one must be 
careful because the statutes of Nova Scotia,39 O ntario40 and
U.N.B. LA W  JOURNAL  31
36 Ibid.
37 [1950] 1 W.W.R. 375 (Sas. R.B.).
38 Ibid.. at p. 379.
39 R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 28.
40 R.S.O. 1970, c. 52.
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Q uebec41 do not declare the payments made by the purchaser to be 
fraudulent and void. This could be very misleading when one 
considers the creditors’ remedies against a purchaser. However, in 
New Brunswick, it is fair to say that the possibility of garnishment of 
the full purchase price within six years, even though there has been 
payment in whole or in part, is a risk that cannot be overlooked.
In addition to the above direct effects of noncompliance with 
the Act, there are a couple of indirect and perhaps not so obvious 
risks that should be considered. For example, when a business is 
being purchased as a going concern, the liabilities of that business 
are often assumed by the purchaser. In that case the purchaser is 
trusting the vendor to the extent that he has disclosed all the trade 
creditors and the amounts owed. In many cases a purchaser might 
be willing to take this risk and waive the Bulk Sales Act since he has 
agreed to pay the creditors in full anyway. However, if he is purchas­
ing a business from a sole proprietor, a partnership, or even a 
corporation which carries on other businesses, such reasoning may 
be dangerous. The Act protects all creditors of the vendor and it has 
been held on several occasions42 that the Act makes no distinction 
between trade and personal creditors, or creditors of different 
businesses carried on by the same legal person. This result seems 
reasonable when we consider that there are no such distinctions 
when a creditor seeks to satisfy his judgment out of the property of a 
judgment debtor. A sole proprietor or partner, for example, has 
unlimited personal liability for the debts of the business, while his 
personal creditors can seize business assets to satisfy their claim. 
Therefore, the purchaser of a sole proprietorship had better consider 
the liabilities he is assuming. Is he willing to take the risk that the 
vendor not pay his Chargex bill, car loan, or mortgage on his house? 
These creditors may have the right to attack the transaction, under 
the Bulk Sales Act.
A final, indirect result of noncompliance with the Act relates to 
the purchaser’s recovery from the vendor. It seems that a purchaser 
is left in the position that he can’t claim or rank as a creditor of the 
vendor for goods that have been returned, or for a part of the 
purchase price that has been attached and thus paid twice. In the 
case of Re White: Ex parte L ip ku s43 there was a sale in bulk but no 
compliance with the Nova Scotia legislation. The vendor went bank­
41 Quebec Civil Code. Article 1569.
42 See for example, W amerv. Graham. [1946] 2 D.L.R. 277 (B.C.S.C.); and Thomp­
son v. Richardson. (1967), 58 W.W.R. 731 at p. 750. See also R.S.O. 1970, c. 52, s. 
4(2), where the legislation does make a distinction between trade and personal 
creditors of a vendor.
43 [1925] 1 D.L.R. 1189 (N.S.C.A.).
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rupt and the purchaser was requested by the trustee in bankruptcy 
to return the goods. The purchaser did so because, as was noted by 
the court, he had no other choice. The purchaser then claimed 
against the estate of the vendor in bankruptcy for the amount he had 
paid the vendor for the goods. The claim was disallowed in the lower 
court and the purchaser appealed. In rejecting the appeal, Mr. 
Justice Ritcher for the court said:
In order to prove his right to rank on the estate Lipkus must travel through 
a transaction fraudulent on his part. I have no alternative but to hold the 
transaction to which he was a party fraudulent because the statute says it 
shall be deemed to be fraudulent and shall be absolutely void as against 
creditors. In Leake on Contracts, 7th ed., p. 579, the law is correctly stated:
— “ i f ,  from the p laintiffs own stating, or otherwise, the cause of action 
appears to arise ex turpi causa, or the transgression of a positive law, there 
the court says he has no right to be assisted'. If it appears on the face of the 
contract or by evidence that the plaintiff requires any assistance from the 
illegal transaction to establish his case, he must fail.” 44
The approach taken here would clearly preclude a purchaser from 
claiming under legislation such as the Creditors Relief Act. This 
result adds further to the penal nature of the legislation. In New 
Brunswick, a purchaser would have an even greater problem in 
recovering payments since s. 9(1) clearly declares any payment made 
by the purchaser to be fraudulent. Further, it would appear that the 
deemed fraud which precludes recovery would have effect for at least 
six years. If a purchaser has been made to pay twice, or has lost 
stock, as a result of noncompliance, any other result would reduce 
the liability of the purchaser as imposed by the statu te.45
In conclusion, it is fair to say that the direct and indirect conse­
quences of not complying with the Bulk Sales Act are substantial, and 
can be of a truly penal character.
44 Ibid.. at p. 1191.
45 See Kerr. op. cit., at p. 187, where it is recommended that such a policy be con­
tinued.
